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In a turn towards pragmatism the Paris 
Climate Change Agreement, concluded 
in December 2015, adopted a markedly 
different architecture for global climate 
governance. It remains to be seen if 
pragmatism produces effectiveness. 
However, in lieu of the approach under 
the Kyoto Protocol, where binding emis-
sion reduction targets for Annex 1  
Parties (broadly, the industrialized coun-
tries) to the Protocol were arrived at by a 
formula, the Paris Agreement records In-
tended Nationally Determined Contribu-
tions (INDCs) arrived at independently 
by the Parties and submitted to the 
United Nations. This turn towards an in-
dependent, non-binding and voluntary 
vocabulary for targets and efforts by 
countries to combat climate change is the 
result of strident resistance by some de-
veloped countries (most notably, the 
United States) to the arrangement arrived 
at in the Kyoto Protocol that placed the 
responsibility for greenhouse gas (GHG) 
mitigations during the first commitment 
period (2008–2012) entirely on the  
industrialized economies. 
 This differentiated approach for under-
taking mitigation actions was derived 
from the principle of Common But Dif-
ferentiated Responsibilities and Respec-
tive Capabilities (CBDRRC). This 
position notes that industrialized coun-
tries account for bulk of the accumulated 
stock of anthropogenic GHGs in the at-
mosphere and hence should bear an im-
mediate and proportionately greater 
responsibility for their mitigation. This 
differentiation, however, was the basis 
for the 95–0 vote of the US Senate on 6 
December 1997 in favour of a resolution 
stating that ‘...the United States should 
not be a signatory to any protocol to, or 
other agreement regarding, the United 
Nations Framework Convention on Cli-
mate Change of 1992, at negotiations in 
Kyoto in December 1997 or thereafter 
which would: (1) mandate new commit-
ments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions for the Annex 1 Parties, 
‘unless the protocol or other agreement 
also mandates new specific scheduled 
commitments to limit or reduce green-
house gas emissions for Developing 
Country Parties’ within the same com-
pliance period; or (2) result in serious 
harm to the U.S. economy’1 (emphasis 
added). 
 This pre-emptive strike, even as the 
Kyoto Conference of Parties deliberating 
the Protocol was underway (1–10 De-
cember 1997), by the country that has 
emitted the largest volume of anthropo-
genic GHGs, and which was at the time 
the largest annual emitter of these gases, 
significantly weakened the Protocol that 
emerged. The argument that developing 
countries have to share the burden of 
GHG mitigation and its implications for 
economic competitiveness has hobbled 
the effectiveness of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Notably, over the last two decades, large 
developing countries have emerged as 
significant GHG emitters. China – now 
the biggest emitter in the world – dwarfs 
the United States in annual emissions of 
GHGs, and India emits more than 
economies like Germany. Despite lower 
(or markedly lower, in the case of India) 
per capita GHG emissions compared to 
industrialized countries, large developing 
economies are now significant net emit-
ters of GHG gasses. This fact, vastly dif-
ferent from the reality of 1997, gave 
further fillip to demands for universaliz-
ing the responsibility for responding to 
anthropogenic climate change. 
 The Paris Climate Change Agreement 
represents the culmination of this two-
decade long, often fractious, negotiation. 
A testament to the pragmatism of this 
new architecture is the fact that in less 
than a year since the Agreement was 
concluded, it has been ratified by 115 of 
the 197 Parties (as of 5 December 2016) 
to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). 
And further, in less than a year on 4 No-
vember 2016, the ratifications exceeded 
the threshold (defined as at least 55 Par-
ties accounting for at least 55% of emis-
sions) needed for the Agreement to come 
into force. This must count as success for 
a global community that ‘only’ two-and-
a-half decades ago resolved to address 
climate change. The complexity of col-
lective decision-making presented by this 
challenge is unprecedented in human his-
tory, demanding new vocabularies for 
understanding the problem and respond-
ing to it. That said, this pragmatic politi-
cal success is crucially a limited one. As 
of this writing, the voluntary, non-
binding contributions of Parties to miti-
gate GHG emissions submitted under the 
Paris Agreement, do not add up to reduc-
tions needed to keep average global tem-
perature from rising above 2C, let alone 
the 1.5C identified in the Paris Agree-
ment itself2. So in reality, we are signifi-
cantly behind in the race and the urgency 
of moving faster cannot be emphasized 
enough. This reality reminds us that the 
pragmatism in politics and geopolitics, 
that has brought about this agreement, 
remains limited. We believe that this 
halfway-home character of these efforts 
makes scrutiny of the assumptions guid-
ing our collective social and economic 
life – ultimately the insatiable demand 
for cheap and abundant fossil or other 
forms energy – in the context of climate 
governance, imperative. 
 In an effort to move the conversation 
in these ways, Azim Premji University, 
Bengaluru organized a Public Forum  
on the Paris Climate Change Agreement 
on 14 July 2016. Lead by an eminent 
panel of invited speakers, the forum  
successfully unpacked the nuances of  
the Paris Agreement and its policy impli-
cations for India. It also problematized 
open-ended economic growth and deve-
lopment from the vantage of climate 
governance. 
 Navroz K. Dubash (Centre for Policy 
Research, New Delhi) clarified the prag-
matic turn represented in the Paris 
Agreement by observing that it ‘recon-
ceptualises the role of international law’ 
by focusing on a process for engagement 
in climate governance, rather than per-
suading countries to follow a top-down 
allocation of carbon budgets. Despite the 
GHG ‘emissions gap’ of 12–17 Gt of 
CO2 equivalent (depending on INDC 
conditionalities and whether 1.5C or 
2.0C is targeted)3, the agreement, he 
submitted, creates the space for a ‘global 
virtuous cycle’ of taking stock and ratch-
eting up future efforts. This achievement 
of building a new architecture for collec-
tive decision-making and action by the 
global community to tackle a planetary 
phenomenon is significant. 
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 At the same time, the Paris Agree-
ment, although non-binding, is premised 
on universalizing mitigation actions and 
in doing so appears to have turned the 
page on historical responsibility for the 
existing atmospheric stock of GHGs.  
Tejal Kanitkar (Tata Institute of Social 
Sciences, Mumbai), shared estimates of 
historical emissions and atmospheric 
carbon budgets to show that industrial-
ized countries have long surpassed their 
fair entitlements to atmospheric carbon 
absorption budgets. Effectively, they 
now over-occupy atmospheric space that 
in fairness belongs to developing econo-
mies, and they will continue to be a  
significant part of the global carbon 
emissions even until the 2030 target of 
the Paris Agreement. Kanitkar concluded 
that ‘late developers will have no carbon 
space left!!’ for their development. In  
effect, these countries are being crowded 
out of the possibility of using fossil fuels 
to industrialize, as their now industrial-
ized predecessors did. 
 India’s INDCs up to 2030 include re-
ducing the emissions intensity per unit 
GDP of the economy by 33–35% below 
2005 levels; achieving 40% share of fos-
sil-free generation capacity and creating 
an additional carbon sink equivalent to 
2.5–3 Gt of CO2 (ref. 4). Given this set 
of intended contributions, Anshu Bha-
radwaj (Centre for the Study of Science, 
Technology and Policy, Bengaluru) 
brought attention to India’s policy op-
tions. Bharadwaj noted that India’s pe-
troleum demand will continue to increase 
as millions will shift from biomass to 
fossil-based cooking fuels, and also the 
increasing transportation demand. There-
fore, a significant portion of the burden 
will have to be borne by raising the energy 
efficiency of the economy by 45–48%. 
Bharadwaj also observed that the costs of 
renewable energy and its availability are 
not constrains to decarbonizing the econ-
omy. However, the task of managing the 
variability of renewable energy genera-
tion and integrating it with the electric 
grid needs significant attention. 
 As noted above, the GHG mitigation 
contributions under the Paris Agreement 
remain inadequate. Even if we assume 
that all countries follow through on their 
independently determined and non-
binding mitigation contributions, there is 
likely to be a significant ‘emissions gap’ 
in 2030. This as a reminder of the dis-
juncture between what is needed and 
what appears possible within political 
pragmatism. We interpret this to mean 
that the response to climate change must 
move beyond the technical, and also 
make the normative aspect of develop-
ment central a new politics of climate 
change. Gita Sen (Ramalingaswami Cen-
tre on Equity and Social Determinants of 
Health, Public Health Foundation of  
India, Bengaluru) asked if the time has 
come to move beyond a focus on ‘con-
sequences’ of climate change to interro-
gating the political and economic 
‘principles’ that drive it.  
 Industrialization fuelled by cheap and 
abundant fossil fuels ushered in an era of 
abundance5 that engendered profound 
social changes like the advance of liber-
alism, capitalism and democracy. De-
spite these epochal transformations, 
poverty still exists and, together with ex-
traordinary levels of inequality, has now 
precipitated into political populism that 
threatens a retreat into narrow identities. 
This, precisely at a time when the reach 
of the human endeavour (alternation of 
the climate) makes a global sense of 
community and collective action impera-
tive. It must be asked: if so much wealth, 
scientific insight, technological prowess 
and political advancement, bought at 
significant costs to diverse socio-
ecological systems, has not definitively 
altered the course of humanity, what 
will? Sen asked ‘what kind of growth are 
we talking about?’ and suggested that a 
more foundational assessment is needed 
via an inquiry into the ‘imaginations’ 
that guide development policy choices. If 
the dominant ideologies of free-market 
capitalism are discredited, then what are 
the alternatives? ‘What is the kind of  
society we want to build?’ she asked. 
What are the ideas and institutions that 
can facilitate such inquiry and delibera-
tion? 
 These questions are pertinent to the 
vocation of creating and disseminating 
knowledge that readers of this publica-
tion are invested in. In addition to con-
versing and collaborating as equals 
across disciplinary identities, be they in 
the humanities, social sciences or natural 
sciences, what is also called for is a de-
cided turn towards critical scholarship. 
The latter is often misunderstood and 
mischaracterized as endless, unproduc-
tive criticism. This is far from the truth. 
Critical scholarship is instead one that 
seeks a deep awareness of the historical 
moment and alignments of power and 
privilege that need to be interrogated and 
even resisted, for the advancement of 
shared well-being. How we fashion  
ourselves through ideas, narratives, insti-
tutions and practices to reimagine deve-
lopment for the common good is an 
urgent question that merits the serious 
consideration of the readers of this publi-
cation. 
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